

ABSTRACT

There are several recurring issues within the CIA that need to be solved to improve the Agency's effectiveness. After researching problems, there appears to be four major problems, these are: Politicization of assessments, the overuse of contractors, the effectiveness of Performance Appraisal Reports, and the lack of power of both the Director of National Intelligence and the Statutory Inspector General. CIA assessments are being politicized by both the analyst and policymaker, and it is effecting public perception and analytic judgements. Although the use of contractors within the CIA was vital at one point, no facet of the US government should rely on private companies. Performance Appraisal Reports only assess an employee using two supervisors, which does not do a good job of adequately evaluating the person. The DNI and Statutory IG, both set up to provide oversight and accountability to the CIA, does not have enough power to effectively govern the Agency. By finishing the implementations of the solutions in the next 10 years, the CIA would become a more exceptional Agency and be provided more affordable oversight and accountability. Solving these problems within the CIA would influence the Intelligence Community in total and would result in better intelligence capabilities for the United States. This paper outlines potential solutions for how to fix these problems within the CIA.

POLITICIZATION OF ANALYSES

Problem

Politicization is not necessarily negative, the word itself means "the action of causing an activity or event to become political in character"

However, when the political view distorts factual assessments, it becomes a problem

- Analysts deliberately alter assessments to support policy outcomes
- When repeated, negative reactions to reports cause analysts to alter future reporting to avoid more negative reactions
- Policymakers subjectively choose among assessments to further their policy agendas
- "Cherry-picking"

Alternatives

- Make sure parochial views do not encompass the whole report, include dissenting views
- Policymakers should read more than the BLUF
- Provide analyses to policymakers that is formatted in such a way that prevents key information from being overlooked

OVERSIGHT POWERS OF THE DNI/STATUTORY IG

Problem

- CIA can bypass the oversight powers and go to White House, Congress
 - Want to keep secrecy and intelligence classifications/ not reveal covert action
- Oversight powers might want to share pieces of covert actions
- Many CIA activities are inherently illegal
 - Possible disconnect between the Agency and oversight powers

Alternatives

- Have CIA utilize the Intelligence Oversight Board more often for legality
- IG may need to be evaluated occasionally for performance satisfaction from Congress and CIA
- Strengthen the DNI position
 - DNI needs support from the White House and IC heads

OVERUSE OF CONTRACTORS

Problem


- Contractors are important; they provide a necessary surge capacity after a major event
- While government workers' responsibility is to U.S. citizens, contracting corporation's responsibilities are to the shareholders
- Using contractors on issues "intimately related to the public interest" is against the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998
- Make up 29% of the intelligence agency personnel, 49% of personnel budget
 - 25% increase in pay for a similar amount of work
- IG and Congress said they were concerned about the number of contractors in use by the IC since 9/11, but they do not make an effort to change anything
- They pull people from government intelligence, deplete the ranks, and put more experience and knowledge in the private sector, which makes contractors even more vital to the government

Alternatives

- Decreasing the reliance on contractors starts at command levels, with the D/CIA, IG, and Congress
- Slowly decrease amount of contractors over 10 years, increase the number of government employees
- Provide some sort of bonuses or incentives for continuing with the government in a GS position
- In an emergency, contractors can be utilized for a weekly basis then be reevaluated continually to determine if they are still needed

Comparative Analysis

	Less contractors	Revamp PARs	Eliminate politicization	Give DNI more power	Proper dissemination of information	Give IG more power
Cost-effectiveness	Cost saved per year w/ no contractors- \$134,673,000 w/ 10% contractors- 44,891,000	Possible reassignment of HR personnel HR salary at ~\$80k per year to go over PARs	No loss of money, increased funding may result from better intelligence products	If effective, it would save money from interagency coordination and other effects of a strong leader	Saves money and lives May take extra time/money to determine who gets what information	More power to IG would save legal/reputation costs in future
Legality	Contractors working on some CIA projects is illegal	Legal	No legal mandates on biases	Legal	Legal	Legal
Political Acceptability	Positive impact, policymakers save money and rely more on government workers	Very acceptable, entirely reliable	Acceptable- some political entities may not like the unbiased reports	Up for debate among lawmakers, may change depending on administration and political party majority	Acceptable and encouraged	Up for debate, has happened in the past. Possibly dependent on political party majority
Policy Sustainability	Very sustainable until a 'surge' is needed for a specific threat	May only be for a few months every year to go over all of the PARs	Sustainable, but inevitable in many cases	Sustainable for periods of time, dependent on political party majority	Sustainable, may see setbacks if information is shared improperly or outside clearance levels	Sustainable for periods of time, dependent on political party majority



PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL REPORTS

Problem

- The PAR doesn't adequately evaluate employees
 - Only rely on supervisor assessments
 - Small comment boxes typically involve one sentence or less
- The system incentivizes officers to satisfy their supervisors

Alternatives

- Should encompass peers and subordinates
- Add a non-OPM performance report that could provide more feedback
 - Could be an add-on to the PAR
- Have performance reports for bosses, the department, and Agency as a whole in order to continually develop new ideas and strategies for evolving the Agency

CONCLUSIONS

- By implementing these suggestions, the CIA would become a more exceptional agency and be provided more affordable oversight and accountability
- Employing these alternatives would save time, money, and encourage a more effective CIA
- After the CIA solves some of these problems, the resulting methods and actions may influence the IC as well
- What would happen if they did not implement these?